Wrongful Life, Turpin v. Sortini by Laufer, Janet A.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
July 2015
Wrongful Life, Turpin v. Sortini
Janet A. Laufer
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laufer, Janet A. (1983) "Wrongful Life, Turpin v. Sortini," Akron Law Review: Vol. 16 : Iss. 2 , Article 7.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss2/7
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
WRONGFUL LIFE
Turpin v. Sortini
31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982)
I. INTRODUCTION
N THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS, several state appellate courts have considered
wrongful birth' and wrongful life2 causes of action.3 While the modern
trend is to allow wrongful birth causes of action," few courts have permitted
wrongful life actions to be maintained.' On May 3, 1982, the California Supreme
Court, in Turpin v. Sortini6 became the first state high court to allow a wrongful
life cause of action. This casenote will examine the reasoning of the Turpin
court in allowing the wrongful life claim. While Turpin appears to signal a
new trend in this area of tort law, there is little doubt that it will generate much
criticism.' Some commentators will suggest that the Turpin court went too far;
8
others that it did not go far enough.' This article will explore the policy
considerations surrounding both sides of the issue.
II. TURPIN V. SORTINi: THE FACTS, HOLDING AND RATIONALE
On September 24, 1976, James and Donna Turpin took their daughter,
'Wrongful birth actions are generally brought by parents of a "wrongfully born" deformed or diseased
child against a physician who allegedly "wrongfully caused" the child's birth. In such a suit, the parents
demand compensation for losses they themselves have sustained as the result of the child's birth. Comment,
Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of Action - Suggestions for a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ.
L. REV. 611, 611 (1980).
'Wrongful life actions are those brought by or on behalf of a child claiming that he was born into a
disadvantaegous life by reason of another's negligence. Id.
'Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), overruled in part, Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.
421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979), was the first of the modern-day cases in this area of tort law.
4See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978),
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895; and most recently, Naccash v. Burger, - Va. __, 290 S.E.2d
825 (1982).
'Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1977), modified sub nom. Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs,
106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (2d Dist. 1980).
631 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). Kaus, J. delivered the majority opinion. Newman,
Richardson and Broussard, JJ. concurred. Mosk, J. filed a dissenting opinion in which Bird, C.J. concurred.
'Curlender also sparked much criticism. See Brown, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort - An
Introduction, 15 U.C.D.L. REV. 445, 446 (1981). Also, the Fifth District California Court of Appeal, in
rejecting the wrongful life cause of action in Turpin, rejected Curlender as "unsound under established
principles of law and as a sortie into areas of public policy clearly within the competence of the Legislature."
Turpin v. Sortini, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 128, 129 (5th Dist. 1981).
'See, e.g., Comment, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 447 (1981).
'Although the California Supreme Court in Turpin recognized the child's right to recover for "economic
loss, the extraordinary, out-of-pocket expenses that she will have to bear because of her hereditary ailment,"
it denied her recovery of general damages. 31 Cal. 3d at -, 643 P.2d at 965-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
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Hope, to the Leon St. Peters Rehabilitation Center at the Fresno Community
Hospital for evaluation of a possible hearing defect. 10 Hope was examined and
tested by Adam J. Sortini, a hearing specialist, who advised Hope's pediatrician
that her hearing was normal."I In December of 1976, the Turpins conceived
a second daughter, Joy, who was born on August 23, 1977.12 In October 1977,
the Turpins learned that Hope was "stone deaf" as the result of an hereditary
ailment. Joy was then diagnosed as suffering from the same total deafness as
Hope. 3
The Turpins filed a complaint setting forth four causes of action, including
a cause of action brought on behalf of Joy seeking: (1) general damages for
being "deprived of the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole
functional human being without total deafness"; and (2) special damages for
the "extraordinary expenses for specialized teaching, training and hearing
equipment" which she would incur during her lifetime as a result of her hearing
impairment.'I The trial court dismissed the action as to Joy, and the Fifth District
California Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal.' 6
While the appeals court relied on the majority of other wrongful life cases
in denying the cause of action, ' 7 the California Supreme Court determined that
Joy could recover special damages in her wrongful life suit. I At the same time,
however, the latter court said Joy could not recover general damages.I 9
In denying recovery for general damages, the court acknowledged that the
defendants had breached a duty owed to Joy and the Joy's birth was the prox-
imate cause of the breach." However, the court emphasized that "the obvious
lId. at __ , 643, P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
'Id.
21d.
S3Id.
"The first cause of action, brought on behalf of Hope, sought damages for the harm Hope allegedly suffered
as a result of the delay in diagnosis of her condition. The second cause of action was Joy's wrongful life
action, the only matter considered by the California Supreme Court. The third and fourth causes of action,
brought on behalf of James and Donna Turpin respectively, sought special damages relating to the support
and medical care of Joy until she reached the age of majority, and general damages for emotional distress
sustained by James and Donna "attendant to the raising and caring of a totally deaf child." Id.
,Isd.
"Turpin v. Sortini, 119 Cal. App. 3d 690, 174 Cal. Rptr. 129 (5th Dist. 1981), rev'd, 31 Cal. 3d __,
643 P.2d 955-56, 1982 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
"7Wrongful life cases denying the cause of action include: Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1st Dist. 1976); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Speck v. Feingold,
268 Pa. Super. 342, 408 A.2d 496 (1981), aff'd, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981). The Stills case involved a wrongful
life action brought by an illegitimate healthy child seeking to recover damages from a doctor who allegedly
did not perform a successful abortion on her mother, therefore causing the child to be born.
"31 Cal. 3d at -, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349. Joy could recover special damages for the
extraordinary expenses necessary to treat her hereditary ailment. Id.
9Id.
2Id. at __ , 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343. The defendants in Turpin did not deny that they
owed a duty of care to Joy, nor did they deny that Joy's birth was the proximate cause of the breach.
The court indicated in dicta that "... it was reasonably forseeable that Hope's parents and their potential
[Vol. 16:2
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tragic fact is the plaintiff never had a chance 'to be born as a whole, functional
human being without total deafness'; if defendants had performed their jobs
properly, she would not have been born with hearing intact, but - according
to the complaint - would not have been born at all." 2' The court disagreed
with other decisions which have suggested that awarding damages to a severely
handicapped, or suffering child would "disavow" the value of life22 and pointed
out that other areas of the law have recognized that impaired life is not always
preferable to nonlife.23 Nevertheless, the court concluded:
With respect to general damages, the harmed interest is the child's general
physical, emotional and psychological well-being, and in considering the
benefit to this interest which defendant's negligence has conferred, it must
be recognized that as an incident of defendant's negligence the plaintiff
has in fact obtained a physical existence with the capacity both to receive
and give love and pleasure as well as to experience pain and suffering.
Because of the incalculable nature of both elements of this harm-benefit
equation, we believe that a reasoned, non-arbitrary award of general
damage is simply not obtainable."
Still, the court upheld Joy's claim for special damages,25 recognizing that
parents' recovery in a wrongful birth action 6 does not extend to expenses the
child may incur when parents are no longer responsible for the child's care. 7
offspring would be directly affected by defendant's negligent failure to discover that Hope suffered from
a hereditary ailment..." (and thus the defendants did owe Joy a duty). Id. The issue of duty, however,
is debatable. One author argues that since Roe reserved to the mother the decision of whether to have
an abortion (at least in the first trimester of pregnancy), the child has no "right not to be born" to exercise,
and thus no duty was owed to it. See Brown, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort - An Introduction,
15 U.C.D. L. REV. 445, 446-47 (1981). Another author disagrees with this contention, saying: "the child
is merely asserting that the decision of whether the child would have been better off not having been born
should be left with . . . its parents." Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
618, 654 (1979).
31 Cal. 3d at __ , 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
"Id. at __ , 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345. In Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. at 430, 404 A.2d at
13, the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested that awarding damages for wrongful life would "disavow"
the value of life.
"131 Cal. 3d at __, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345. The court referred to California's "living
will" statute. This statute permits an adult "to make a written directive instructing his physician to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining procedures in the event of a terminal condition." Cal. Health and Safety Code
§ 7186 (West Supp. 1982).
31 Cal. 3d at __ , 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347. The court followed the "benefit" doctrine
in tort damages, which says: "When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff
... and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the
value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable."
Maben v. Rankin, 55 Cal. 2d 139, 144, 358 P.2d 681, 686, 10 Cal. Rptr. 353, 358, (1961) quoted in Turpin,
31 Cal. 3d at __ , 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
"31 Cal. 3d at __ , 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
"In a separate cause of action, Joy's parents sought to recover for medical expenses which they would
incur on Joy's behalf during her minority. Id. at __, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339. This is
the usual scope of damages awarded in wrongful birth actions. See Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic
Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 658-60 (1979).
"31 Cal. 3d at __, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348. The court also noted that allowing the child
to recover these expenses "should also help ensure that the available tort remedies in this area provide
a comprehensive and consistent deterrent to negligent conduct." Id. at __ , 643 P.2d at 966 n.15, 182
Cal. Rptr. at 349 n.15.
Fall, 19821 RECENT CASES
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The court explained:
[W]e believe it would be illogical and anamolous to permit only parents,
and not the child, to recover for the cost of the child's own medical care.
If such a distinction were established, the afflicted child's receipt of
necessary medical expenses might well depend on the wholly fortuitous
circumstance of whether the parents are available to sue and recover such
damages or whether the medical expenses are incurred at a time when
parents remain legally responsible for providing such care.2"
In addition, the court said" [wie believe that it is consistent with the basic
liability principles... to hold defendants liable for the cost of such care, whether
the expenses is to be borne by the parents or by the child." 2 9
A short concurrence in this decision suggested that "basic changes of the
kind sought here are better left to the Legislature." ' 0 The dissenting opinion
argued that general damages, as well as special damages, should be recoverable
in this case.3"
III. WRONGFUL BIRTH AND WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSES OF ACTION: A BRIEF HISTORY
The first wrongful life action brought before an appellate court was Zepeda
v. Zepeda. 32 This action was brought on behalf of an illegitimate infant against
the child's father, alleging that the father wrongfully induced the child's mother
to engage in sexual relations, thus causing the child's conception.33 The Illinois
Appellate Court denied the child's claim, stating:
Recognition of the plaintiff's claim means creation of a new tort: a cause
of action for wrongful life. The legal implications of such a tort are vast,
the social impact could be staggering. .... Encouragement would extend
to all others born into the world under conditions they might regard as
adverse.34
"Id. at __, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
29Id.
"Id. at __, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349. In Curlender, the Second District California Court
of Appeal suggested that children could maintain an action against their own parents for wrongful life.
106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 497. In response to this, the California Legislature enacted
CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982) which exempts parents from liability in such an instance. The court in
Turpin determined that this statute had no bearing on the case. 31 Cal. 3d at __, 643 P.2d at 959, 182
Cal. Rptr. at 342.
3'Id. at __ , 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting). The dissent followed
the rationale of the majority opinion in Curlender.
3241 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1st Dist. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
341 Il. App. 2d at 243, 190 N.E.2d at 851. There is a fundamental difference between this action and
the action of a deformed or impaired child. Cases such as the former are now most commonly referred
to as "dissatisfied life" cases. Comment, "Wrongful Life": the Right Not to be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV.
480, 485-86 (1980). There has been some suggestion that had the first wrongful life cases been brought
by physically or mentally deformed children, the law in this area would have developed differently. See,
e.g., Note, Medical Malpractice: Wrongful Birth, Preconception Torts, Duty to Inform of Genetic Risks,
13 AKRON L. REV. 390, 395 (1979).
"41 Ill. App. 2d at 250, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
[Vol. 16:2
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As noted before, the first wrongful life case involving an impaired child
was Gleitman v. Cosgrove. I5 There, Mrs. Gleitman's physician had advised her
that her child, Jeffrey, would be born normal, despite his knowledge that Mrs.
Gleitman had had rubella (commonly known as German measles) at an early
stage of her pregnancy.36 Jeffrey Gleitman developed impaired sight, hearing,
and speech.37 The Gleitmans brought a wrongful life action on Jeffrey's behalf
and a wrongful birth suit on their own behalf. Both causes of action were denied
by the New Jersey Supreme Court, 3 which stated:
The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between his life
with defects against the utter void of non-existence, but it is impossible
to make such a determination. This Court cannot weigh the value of life
with impairments against the non-existence of life itself. By asserting that
he should not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes it logically im-
possible for a court to measure his alleged damages because of the im-
possibility of making the comparison required by compensatory remedies. 9
Twelve years after Gleitman, the New Jersey Supreme Court again had
a wrongful birth/wrongful life claim before it in Berman v. Allan.4" Shirley
Berman became pregnant with Sharon Berman when she was thirty-eight years
old. She was under the care of two obstetrician/gynecologists, Dr. Allan and
Dr. Attardi. The physicians failed to perform a amniocentesis4' on Shirley to
determine whether the child she was carrying had Downs syndrome.42 Follow-
ing Sharon's birth with Downs syndrome, the Bermans brought a wrongful
life claim on behalf of Sharon and a wrongful birth claim on their own behalf.
While the New Jersey Supreme Court once again denied the child's wrongful
3149 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), overruled in part, Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
"Id. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690. "Most congenital defects from rubella occur during the first eight weeks
of gestation. The defects include congenital cataracts, heart disease, deafness and central nervous system
damage...
"... Therapeutic abortion is indicated when rubella occurs during the first trimester because of the
great probability of irrevocable damage." J. GREENHILL & E. FRIEDMAN, BIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND
MODERN PRACTICE OF OBSTETRICS 447 (1974).
749 N.J. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
"The aspect of Gleitman dealing with wrongful birth was overruled in Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,
404 A.2d 8 (1979).
1149 N.J. at 25, 227 A.2d at 692. By this, the court meant two things. First, it would be difficult to calculate
damages, since a trier of fact cannot comprehend nonexistence, thus, it would be impossible to calculate
the difference in value between that state and the net burdens the child experiences in life. Secondly, there
is an internal contradiction in wrongful life claims: the "wrongful life" complained of is the same one
that allows the child to assert his claim. Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
618, 648 (1980).
'080 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
"Amniocentesis is a "technique of removing fluid from the uterine cavity for the purposes of identification
of the phenotype of the fetus." The information derived from this procedure can usually detect Downs
syndrome, Tay-Sachs disease, and other disorders of the fetus. G. CHASE & E. MURPHY, THE PRINCIPLES
OF GENETIC COUNSELING 324-34 (1975).
4'Downs syndrome is a genetic defect with a greater risk of Downs syndrome in the child when the mother
is thirty-five years old or older. T. KELLEY, CLINICAL GENETICS & GENETIC COUNSELING 129 (1980).
Therefore, amniocentesis is indicated when the mother is thirty-five years old or older. A. STEVENSON,
B. DAVISON & M. OAKES, GENETIC COUNSELING 297 (2d ed. 1976).
RECENT CASESFall, 1982]
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life claim,"3 it reversed its holding in Gleitman and allowed the action for
wrongful birth."
Eighteen months before the Berman decision, in Park v. Chessin,"4 the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, became the first appellate court
to allow a claim for the wrongful life of a child born with a genetic defect.
That decision, however, was reversed in Becker v. Schwartz.46
Thus, the only wrongful life action in the United States that had ever been
completely successful before Turpin was Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories.47
In Curlender, Phillis and Hyum Curlender retained defendant laboratory to
determine if they were carriers of Tay-Sachs disease.4s The laboratory performed
the test and inaccurately informed the Curlenders that they were not carriers
of Tay-Sachs. 4 1 Subsequently, Phillis Curlender gave birth5" to Shauna
Curlender, who had Tay-Sachs.5 The Curlenders brought a wrongful life action
on behalf of Shauna, seeking: (1) damages for the costs of Shauna's care; (2)
damages for emotional distress and the deprivation of seventy-two and six-tenths
years of her life; and (3) punitive damages of three million dollars.5 2 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal allowed the wrongful life claims for the costs of Shauna's
care," and punitive damages.5 4 The court limited damages for emotional distress
saying:
We reject as untenable the claim that plaintiff is entitled to damages as
"The court suggested that to rule otherwise would "disavow" the value of life. 404 A.2d at 13.
"Gleitman was decided before Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), where the United States Supreme Court
held that a state may not restrict a woman's right to abort in the first trimester of pregnancy. 410 U.S.
at 163. In Gleitman, part of the reason that the court denied the wrongful birth cause of action was that
it was not clear that abortion was legal in New Jersey. 49 N.J. at 25, 227 A.2d at 691. In Berman the
court explained: "The Supreme Court's ruling in Roe . . . clearly establishes that a woman possess a
constitutional right to decide whether her fetus should be aborted.... Public policy now supports, rather
than mitigates against, the proposition that she not be impermissably denied a meaningful opportunity
to make that decision." 80 N.J. at 428, 404 A.2d at 14.
'160 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1977).
4646 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). For an excellent discussion of Park and Becker
see Note, Medical Malpractice: Wrongful Birth, Preconception Torts, Duty to Inform of Genetic Risks,
13 AKRON L. REV. 390 (1979).
"106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (2d Dist. 1980).
"Id. at 815, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
"Id. at 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 483. Tay-Sachs disease is a "fatal progressive degenerative disease of the
nervous system which primarily affects the Eastern European Jewish population and their progeny." Howard
v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (Cook, J., dissenting). In Tay-Sachs,
"the first symptoms are noticeable at five to six months. Psychomotor deterioration is evident before
one year and usually advances rapidly in the second year, resulting in blindness, deafness, seizures and
a decerebrate state .... Death, usually caused by broncho-pneumonia, intervenes between age three and
four years." L. JACKSON & R. SCHIMKE, CLINICAL GENETICS: A SOURCE BOOK FOR PHYSICIANS (1979).
"The complaint did not allege the date of plaintiff's birth, so the court did not know whether the parents
relied upon the tests in conceiving, or relied upon the results in failing to avail themselves of amniocentesis
and abortion. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
'Id.
"5Id. at 816-17, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
"106 Cal. App. at 831, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 499. The court suggested that upon remand Shauna's wrongful
life claim and her parents' wrongful birth claim should be consolidated to prevent double recovery. Id.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:2
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if plaintiff had been born without defects and would have had a normal
life expectency. Plaintiff's right to damages must be considered on the
basis of plaintiff's mental and physical condition at birth and her expected
condition during the short life span ... anticipated for one with her im-
paired condition."
The court went on to say:
[W]e reject the notion that a "wrongful life" cause of action involves any
attempted evaluation of a claimed right not to be born. In essence, we
construe the "wrongful-life" cause of action by the defective child as the
right of such child to recover damages for the pain and suffering to be
endured during the limited life span available to such a child and for any
special pecuniary loss resulting from the impaired condition.1
6
Thus, the Curlender court allowed a greater extent of recovery than the Califor-
nia Supreme Court did in Turpin."
Only four months before the California Supreme Court handed down its
opinion in Turpin, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania examined the same
wrongful life issues in Speck v. Finegold. 58 In Speck, Frank Speck Jr. suffered
from neurofibromatosis," a genetic disease. He and his wife had two children,
both of whom inherited the disease. 60 The couple decided not to have anymore
children and Mr. Speck went to Dr. Finegold for a vasectomy.' 1 After the vasec-
tomy was performed and Mr. Speck was pronounced sterile, Mrs. Speck became
pregnant. 2 Subsequently, the Specks engaged Dr. Schwartz to perform an abor-
tion on Mrs. Speck. Although Dr. Schwartz performed the abortion and told
Mrs. Speck that she was no longer pregnant, Mrs. Speck nevertheless gave birth
"Id.
"Id. at 830, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
"Id. at 830-31, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
"Perhaps one reason for the differences in the Turpin and Curlender recoveries is the extent of the child's
impairment. The Supreme Court of California suggested as much in Turpin:
In this case in which the plaintiffs only affliction is deafness, it seems quite unlikely that a jury
would ever conclude that life with such a condition is worse than not being born at all. Other wrongful
life cases, however, have involved children with much more serious, debilitating and painful
conditions, and the academic literature refers to still other, extremely severe hereditary diseases.
31 Cal. 3d at - , 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46.
"439 A.2d 110 & (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1981). This case was decided on December 31, 1981, four months before
Turpin was decided.
"Neurofibromatosis, an extremely disfiguring disease, is "a familial condition characterized by
developmental changes in the nervous system muscle, bones and skin and marked superficially by the
formation of multiple pendunculated soft tumors with areas of pigmentation." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 886 (26th ed. 1981).
6439 A.2d at 113.
"Id. This case is admittedly different from the typical wrongful life action where the parents, had they
been accurately advised of the possibility of a deformed birth, would have chosen not to have the child.
Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 482, 485 n.34 (1980). Still, the
policy issues in this wrongful life action are basically the same.
"1439 A.2d at 113.
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to Francine Speck, a victim of neurofibromatosis. 63
The Specks brought wrongful life and wrongful birth actions against Dr.
Finegold and Dr. Schwartz. 6" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices were
equally divided as to whether Francine's wrongful life action could be main-
tained, and hence the intermediate appellate court decision denying the cause
of action stood.65
The opinion of one of the justices66 was strongly critical of courts which
have denied recovery for wrongful life. He noted a policy consideration not
considered by the Turpin court, nor any other court which has considered
wrongful life, but one worthy of acknowledgement:
Existence in itself can hardly be characterized as an injury, but when ex-
istence is foreseeably and inextricably coupled with a disease, such an ex-
istence, depending upon the nature of the disease,67 may be intolerably
burdensome. To judicially foreclose consideration of whether life in a par-
ticular case is such a burden would be to tell the diseased, possibly deformed
plaintiff that he can seek no remedy in the Courts and to imply that his
alternative remedy, in the extreme event that he finds his life unduly burden-
some, is suicide. No court in the land would directly send such a message
to these plaintiffs. We deem it unfortunate that some Courts have indeed
sent that message by implication. 8
Justice Flaherty agreed with the Curlender court that damages in a wrongful
life case should include general damages for suffering as well as special damages
for expenses. 69 A second opinion in this case declared:
Any argument that this life of suffering is not the natural and probable
consequence of appellees' misconduct is rank sophistry .... To permit
such a wrong to go unredressed would provide no deterrent to profes-
sional irresponsibility and would be neither just nor compatible with this
Commonwealth's principles of tort liability.7"
Nevertheless, another opinion in Speck took the opposing viewpoint,
pointing out that "none of the highest appellate courts of other jurisdictions
has recognized such a cause of action." 7' A fourth opinion even suggested that
"Id. This demonstrates what some parents must go through to avoid having a deformed child despite
the Roe decision.
"Id. The trial court dismissed Francine's wrongful life claim, and the Pennsylvania Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal.
"Id. at I11.
"This opinion was by Justice Flaherty, in which Justice Larsen joined.
"Where the plaintiff suffers from neurofibromatosis or Tay-Sachs there is a much stronger case for allowing
a wrongful birth claim than where the plaintiff suffers from a hearing defect. 31 Cal. 3d at __, 643
P.2d at 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46.
"439 A.2d at 115.
9Id.
"Id. at 118. This opinion, written by Justice Kauffman, was joined by Justices Larsen and Flaherty.
"Id. at 116. This opinion, written by Justice Roberts and joined by Chief Justice O'Brien pointed out
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to allow wrongful life claims might be a societal attempt to control genetics,
"merely ploys for the extermination of a weaker group by a stronger and more
powerful one."72
Thus there were two completely opposing viewpoints in Speck; one seek-
ing to allow recovery for both special and general damages in a wrongful life
suit, the other advocating no recovery at all for wrongful life. 3 Both sides ex-
pressed valid concerns and both views find ample support in the academic
community."4 Until Turpin, there appeared to be no way that a court could
reconcile the two views."
IV. TURPIN V. SORTINI: A FRESH APPROACH TO WRONGFUL LIFE
In a meritorious decision, the California Supreme Court acknowledged
the validity of both views, and combined the best of both in Turpin. In wrongful
life cases the alleged injury is the life of the child.7 6 This creates a problem for
our courts since traditionally our common law has highly valued human life.
Furthermore, basic tort principles do not support recovery for general damages
in wrongful life suits. Traditional tort law applies an objective "reasonable man"
standard to determine existence of an injury.7 8 Thus, in order to recover under
traditional tort law, the child bringing the wrongful life claim would have to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonable person would con-
clude that the child is so impaired that he would have been better off never
to have been born.7 9 The inherent problem with this is the difficulty in deter-
mining what a reasonable person would conclude.8" This question really lends
itself to a subjective standard,81 which is an "unwarranted departure from tradi-
tional tort law." Such a departure is not one to be made by the courts, but
should be left to the legislatures.8"
that "[e]ven Curlender .. .has recently been called into question by a subsequent panel of that same
intermediate Appellate Court in Turpin." Id.
21d. at 119. This opinion was written by Justice Nix.
"The Speck court considered the claims for general and special damages collectively, not independently
as the Turpin court did.
'There is considerable commentary opposing allowance of claims for wrongful life. See, Comment, supra
note 8. Commentary supporting the cause of action include: Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 618 (1979); Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV.
480 (1980).
"5It has been suggested that wrongful birth claims should allow for a portion of the parent's compensation
to be put into a reversionary trust for the child to "protect the child from his parent's irresponsibility."
This, however, would not compensate the child should his parents not bring a wrongful birth action first.
See Comment, supra note 8.
"Id. at 459.
171d.
"See Id. at 461; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 45 (4th ed. 1971).
"See W. PROSSER, supra note 8.
"0"An objective standard derived from community values does not rationally inform such an intensely
personal evaluation." Comment, supra note 75, at 461.
"Id. at 461-62.
"31 Cal. 3d 200, __, 643 P.2d 954, 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 349 (1982) (Newman, J., concurring).
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Even if there were a basis in tort law for such claims, there is a major
problem in establishing damages. 3 Again, this determination lends itself to a
highly subjective, personal approach which could create a great deal of incon-
sistency among verdicts.
While the "disavowing the value of life" approach some courts ' have taken
is unsound, as Turpin points out, a monetary award for pain and suffering
is not going to significantly improve the plaintiff's condition." Likewise, a court
does not encourage suicide by denying such damages.16 If a wrongful life plaintiff
is in such miserable condition that he or she contemplates suicide, it is unlikely
that the economic ability to purchase a new television, or take a trip around
the workd, will convince him or her that life is worthwhile. 7
Special damages for wrongful life, on the other hand, do have a basis in
tort principles. 8 By breaching a duty owed to the parents, the defendant has
caused the parents to bear the extra cost of bringing up the diseased or handi-
capped child. Should the child live long enough, this damage extends to the
child's own expenses in obtaining medical care, special training, and the like. 8
The benefit doctrine need not be applied,9 ° so there is no need to balance im-
paired life against nonlife in assessing damages.
Furthermore, awarding special damages for wrongful life serves a signifi-
cant policy goal of deterrence. 91 While recovery in wrongful life claims may
suffice as such a deterrent against negligent genetic counseling, 92 it might not
hold defendants completely responsible for the wrong because pecuniary losses
of the child are not taken into account. 9 As one author puts it:
The most obvious consequences [of allowing damages for wrongful life]
will be the assessment of damages in an increasing number of cases if physi-
"Id. at __ , 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
'See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. at 427, 404 A.2d at 13.
"31 Cal. 3d at __, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
"6One opinion in Speck suggested that to disallow wrongful life claims would be to encourage suicide for
diseased or handicapped children. 439 A.2d at 115.
"However, Capron argues that:
Although a monetary judgment for pain and suffering cannot make them "whole," any more than
it actually does for most injured persons, it may provide some balm for the inner wounds of
congenitally defective children if it is spent so as to bring some compensating joy, and the feeling
of being "special" in a good sense, into their lives." Caprin, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 655 (1979).
"Special damages are the pecuniary damages covering expenses for the impaired child's care and training,
which the court in Turpin said could be recovered.
"See 31 Cal. 3d at - , 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 968.
"Id. at __, 643 P.2d at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
"Id. at __, 643 P.2d at 966 n.15, Cal. Rptr. at 349 n.15. See also Capron, supra note 87, at 660.
"See Comment, supra note 8, at 467. Contra, Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM.
L. REV. 618, 658, 660 (1979).
""[The absence of an entire category of damages - those suffered by the child - can be expected to
result in underdeterrence because there is no assurance that the jury in setting the amount to be collected
by the parents will take the excluded category of harm into account." Capron, supra note 87, at 658.
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cians and others who provide health care to people planning families fail
either to make use of the new information and techniques of clinical genetics
or to refer patients to persons who are more knowledgeable in that
field.... The recognition of a right of recovery does not create the costs
but merely shifts the burden of bearing them from the injured parties to
the person whose wrong brought them into being. 94
One consequence of permitting the child-plaintiff in a wrongful life action
to recover only special damages is that children who will never be independent
of their parents or guardians9 5 have no remedy in the courts. On the surface
this might strike one as unfair. The extremely deformed child who dies at an
early age cannot recover, while the deaf child who lives a long life can recover.
Nevertheless, both children will have their pecuniary losses covered for their
entire life span.
V. CONCLUSION
While much disagreement exists in the courts and the academic community
as to whether a diseased or handicapped child should be able to collect damages
from a genetic counselor, physician, or other person who wrongfully caused
his or her birth, the California Supreme Court reconciled both views in Turpin
v. Sortini. By disallowing general damages for pain and suffering, it recogniz-
ed that such a claim invites a subjective approach inconsistent with basic tort
principles. At the same time, the court recognized that compensating a plain-
tiff's parents for wrongful birth may not suffice in providing a source of funds
for special care that a diseased or handicapped child needs. Additionally, the
court recognized the important function of deterrence served by allowing
pecuniary damages for wrongful life. No doubt courts will continue to strug-
gle with wrongful life causes of action, but Turpin provides a much needed
framework for evaluating these cases.
JANET ANN LAUFER
"Id. at 660.
"For instance, children who die before reaching the age of majority.
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